South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business
Volume 14
Issue 1 Fall

Article 8

2017

REFORMS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: COMPETING MODELS
AND EMERGING TRENDS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE
EUROPEAN UNION
Akio Otsuka

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/scjilb
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Otsuka, Akio (2017) "REFORMS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: COMPETING MODELS AND EMERGING
TRENDS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE EUROPEAN UNION," South Carolina Journal of International
Law and Business: Vol. 14 : Iss. 1 , Article 8.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/scjilb/vol14/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons.
For more information, please contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

REFORMS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
COMPETING MODELS AND EMERGING TRENDS IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
Akio Otsuka*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Large public corporations are hierarchical organizations. The
Board of Directors is generally at the apex of the hierarchy. Most
formal legal authority within the corporation is vested in the Board,
although the Board delegates much of its authority to executive
officers, who in turn delegate much to middle-level managers, and so
on down.
The predominant academic view of corporate law today rests on
the principal-agent paradigm. Most corporate law scholarship has
continued to analyze corporate law in terms of agency relationships,
as based upon the classic Berle-Means-type separation of ownership
and control under a dispersed ownership structure. Corporate law
places a great deal of authority in the Board. However, the reality is
that the CEO wields primacy. The CEO dominated corporate
governance system aided in igniting the current economic crisis,
wherein many CEOs encouraged corporate practices aimed at shortterm share price maximization and ignored long-term risks.
Corporate law has mechanisms to hold boards accountable for
gross misuse of their authority. However, those mechanisms are
Corporate
law must balance authority against accountability, but most of the
time, in the United States, corporate law strikes that balance in favor
of authority. Many corporate law scholars have argued for corporate
law reforms that give more strength to legal accountability
mechanisms, such as shareholder voting, shareholder bylaws, or
derivative suits. One of the essential normative questions in
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corporate law is how the market should balance authority against
accountability.
Berle and Means are still correct. The status quo in a modern
public corporation is not traditional shareholder primacy, team
production, or director primacy. Rather, it is CEO domination. If
boards, prior to the financial crisis, had successfully monitored
serious events, such as the recent financial crisis, by relying on
independent information, they might have been able to challenge
their CEOs and executive officers to increase the long-term wellbeing and value of their corporations. The interests of not only
shareholders but also other corporate constituencies and that of the
public would be far better served with shareholder primacy.
Corporate governance reform must focus primarily on promoting the
long-term wellinterests, and ensuring accountability. There are various approaches
to achieving such goals.
This paper considers the implications of the enlightened
shareholder value model and other reforms made in the United
Kingdom (U.K.) and the European Union (E.U.), and proposes
corporate law reforms that give more strength to accountability
mechanisms. Part II describes and analyzes two views of the
corporation: the agency model and the team production model. It
explains why the team production model offers a false account of
current reality, and then moves to the director primacy model. Part
III discusses the functions of a public corporation. Independent
monitoring boards currently cannot discover any serious problems
with the business decisions of executive officers because independent
directors inevitably rely heavily on corporate officers for information
used in monitoring tasks. This also holds true for the director
primacy model and the team production model. Part IV proposes a
corporate governance reform that is embodied in the enlightened
shareholders value model, which was a part of the 2006 U.K.
Companies Act and other reforms made in the United Kingdom and
the E.U.; this suggests that the Board should promote the long-term
wellensuring accountability.

II. BACKGROUND: TWO VIEWS OF THE CORPORATION
The current discussion related to policy issues on corporate law
is based on the economic theory of the firm. Depending upon how
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we analyze such theories, there are two primary perspectives: the
agency model and the team production model. Whereas the former
emphasizes the principal-agent relationship between shareholders and
managers, the latter brings other non-shareholder constituencies into
consideration. These models are analyzed in a descriptive and
normative light.

The agency view dominates most corporate law scholarship
today. In 1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means were the first to
empirically identify the strong separation of ownership between
shareho
corporations.1 They
argued that most public corporations are not operated in the interests
of their owners, the shareholders, but in the interests of their agents,
the managers. 2 Around the 1970s, legal scholars developed the
theory of the firm, based on the economic theories of Ronald Coase
and other forerunners, which focused primarily on efficiency and the
production processes.3
which is now the dominant corporate law theory, a firm is made up
of various explicit and implicit contracts among
constituencies.
4
various inputs acting together to pro
While
Michael Jensen and William Meckling emphasized the nature of the
firm as a nexus of contracts5 a center of coordination of productive
factors consisting of explicit and implicit contracts ,6 the nature of
1

See Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
2
See id. at 124.
3
, THE ECONOMIST, July 27, 2017,
https://www.economist.com/news/economics-brief/21725542-if-markets-areso-good-directing-resources-why-do-companies-exist-first-our.
4
Stephen M. Bainbridge, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 28 (2008).
5
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
6
E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 12 (1991). See generally Armen A. Alchain
& Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
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the firm as a legal entity is not explained under the terms of the
theory.
independent existence. 7 Jensen and Meckling then focused on agency
costs, which the upper-level managers created (who are charged with
8
The agency costs represent
conflicts of interest between shareholders, which consist of
monitoring costs, bonding costs, and residual losses that contractual
mechanisms cannot entirely eliminate. 9 The nexus of contracts
theory has been influential in shaping corporate law theory over the
past three decades.10
This
nothing about why firms exist or what kind of activity is undertaken
11
Rather, it is only a theory of agency costs within
certain types of firms, including corporations. 12 If a corporation is
really no more than a nexus of contracts under the theory, there
should be no need for corporations or corporate law. If the notion of
corporations is not necessary, there is no need for the law to create
and support them. Thus, the nexus of contracts theory has been
argued outside of the theory of the firm and as a descriptive model
for corporate law scholars.
However, the nexus of contracts theory argues that corporate law
represents several default contracts that permit the involved parties to
opt out of these relations through agreement. 13 Consequently, its
proponents assert that corporate law should be mostly non-mandatory
to provide private parties with the opportunity to spontaneously order

7

Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5, at 311; Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L
irm is not a
8

See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5, at 311.
Id. at 310-11.
10
See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 1 39 (discussing
the corporate contract); Thomas S. Ulen, The Coasean Firm in Law and
Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 318 27 (1993) (discussing the importance
and impact of the nexus-of-contracts theory).
11
Michael J. Meurer, Law, Economics, and the Theory of the Firm,
52 BUFF. L. REV. 727, 731 32 (2004).
12
See Oliver Hart,
the Theory of the
Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1763 65 (1989).
13
Ulen, supra note 10, at 322.
9
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their affairs as they deem appropriate.14 Thus, the proponents of the
nexus of contracts theory have emphasized the non-mandatory nature
of corporate law, and they have counseled against changes to the
status quo based on the contractual nature of that status quo. 15
primac
are assumed to act as the ultimate principals in agency contracts that
that makes up the firm. 16 Directors and officers are treated under
such contracts as contractual agents of the shareholders, with
fiduciary obligations to maximize shareholder wealth. 17 Thus,
according to the nexus of contracts theory, shareholders retain a
privileged position among the various contracting parties that
constitute the firm, while the interests of non-shareholder
constituencies remain subordinated. 18 However, it is generally
acknowledged that shareholder wealth maximization is itself only a
norm of corporate behavior, rather than a legal rule.19 Indeed, neither
case law nor corporate statutes impose on directors and officers an
obligation to maximize shareholder wealth. 20 Even in Delaware,
whose corporate code is less amenable to stakeholder interests than
many other state corporate statutes,
-making
is not required to maximize shareholder wealth,
21

Moreover, the Delaware courts have held that directors and officers
have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation,
14

Id. at 324.
Id. at 322 23 (discussing the overall impact of the theory).
16
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and
Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 N.W.UNIV. L. REV. 547, 547-48 (2003).
17
Id. at 548.
18
Id.
19
Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of
Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L
recognize that shareholder primacy functions more as a norm than an
enforceable legal r
20
See Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986);
Contra,
, 571 A.2d 1140, 1145, 1155
(Del. 1990).
21
See Fisch, supra
corporate statute is silent both with respect to the standard by which board
decisions are evaluated and with respect to the stakeholders, whose interests
may legitimately be taken into account).
15
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and not only in the interests of the shareholders. 22 The courts also
state that f
23
Consequently, courts will not second-guess
ss judgment that is based on concerns about
employees, communities, and other non-shareholder constituencies
without finding a clear breach of fiduciary duty.
The nexus of contracts theory has attracted considerable critique,
wherein it is premised on the
an ideal market comprised of perfectly rational economic decisionmakers.24 Moreover, as stated above, a necessity for corporations or
corporate law is uncertain under the theory, because the theory is
only a theory of agency costs and a corporation is no more than a
nexus of contracts. Certainly, the fundamental corporate governance
structures and mechanisms that Berle-Means-type corporations in the
United States adopted are conceived as static and uniform. However,
the corporate governance structures in public corporations vary, and
thereby, there is no ideal stock market as well.

Generally, under state corporate statutes, shareholders alone
enjoy voting rights, information rights, and the right to bring
derivative suits. In a series of articles, Margaret Blair and Lynn
Stout have developed a team production theory of corporate law
hierarch, balancing
constituencies.25

22

the

interests

of

to act as a mediating
the various corporate

See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (overruled
on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000)).
23
., 678 A.2d 533, 539 (Del.
1996); see also, Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225, 238 (Del. Ch. 1938) (
nom. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939)).
24
See Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate
Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 796 (2006).
25
See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 276 87 (1999).
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DESCRIPTION OF THE THEORY

Like the nexus of contracts theory, the team production model
views the firm as a series of relationships between various
constituencies.26 While arguing that the Board of Directors serves as
the ultimate authority in assigning responsibilities, mediating
disputes, and distributing profits, Blair and Stout do not claim that
the goal of the corporation should be shareholder wealth
maximization. 27 Instead, the corporation is made up of all
constituencies who are responsible for the business of the enterprise,
and the directors have a responsibility to all of these constituencies in
the corporate enterprise. 28
which corporate law actually works in practice is consistent with the
notion that directors are independent hierarchs whose
run [chiefly] to the corporate entity itself and
29
Thus, directors are
unique form of fiduciary who most closely resemble trustees. 30
shareholders but to the legal entity of the firm itself. 31 Team
members submit to the hierarchy and the ownership on their own, as
this is beneficial for them. 32 Blair and Stout argue that shareholders
are not the only residual risk bearers within a corporation. 33
Additionally, other corporate constituencies who are also the residual
risk-bearers frequently make firm-specific investments for example,
employees specialize their human capital. 34 Such investments are
obviously essential for the creation of value in the firm. Therefore, it
26
27

Id. at 254 (asserting the team production approach

Id. at 251.
See id. at 253.
29
Id. at 289.
30
Id. at 290-91.
31
Id. at 274 n.57.
32
Id. at 274.
33
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and
the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 403, 418
(2001).
34
See id
-even suppliers,
customers, and communities-also make firm-specific investments that tie
28
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seems appropriate and necessary for team members who make firmspecific investments to delegate exclusive authority to the Board of
Directors as a mediating hierarch to organize the
distribute its outputs, and resolve interest conflicts among the team
members. 35 In a more descriptive manner, each team member
charges the Board of Directors with (1) mediating among the
conflicting interests of all the constituencies and (2) protecting all
36
investment opportunistic behavior by other constituencies.
The
Board of Directors is not a team member and must be independent of
any of the team members, 37 which implies that the Board has no
expectation of sharing in the value that the team created. Given the
firm-specific investments the team members made, the Board serves
39
similarly to a trustee 38
) or fiduciary 40 for the
entire firm, but it remains insulated from any direct team member
control.
including shareholders, directors are to assume the task of balancing
conflicting interests and, if necessary, rearranging production
factors.41
the interests of the corporation not as shareholder interest, but as the
aggregate welfare function.42
2.

PRECURSOR OF THE THEORY

deeply dependent
upon the works of Alchian and Demsetz, and Rajan and Zingales for
a new school of corporate law and economics based on the theory of
the firm.43 Blair and Stout discuss the principal-agent and property
rights approaches and draw comprehensively on the work of Alchian
35

Id. at 421.
See id.
specific inputs and surplus that results from team produ
of Directors, the team members charge and entrust the Board of Directors
with these duties).
37
Id.
36

38
39
40
41
42
43

Blair & Stout, supra note 25, at 291.
Blair & Stout, supra note 33, at 408.
Blair & Stout, supra note 25, at 291.
Blair & Stout, supra note 33, at 421.
Blair & Stout, supra note 25, at 288 89.
See id. at 265-69
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and Demsetz in conceptualizing the firm as a method for
coordinating production.44 Then, they move on to consider the work
of Holmstrom, 45 Tirole, 46 and Rajan and Zingales 47 in developing
their own team production model.
output, either to define or determine each member
48
In accordance with Alchian
and Demsetz, for team production to be successful, several
contributors must put forth investments of resources, in certain
49

However, it is difficult to define the contribution of each to this
value.50 A difficulty arises in designing payment schemes as to how
to counteract the incentives of the team members to shirk since the
rewarding is not made on the basis of actual individual
contributions. 51 Alchian and Demsetz argue that monitoring and
sanctioning generally counteract shirking incentives within team
production. 52 Individuals have an incentive to free ride on the
contributions of others, which is disadvantageous for the whole
team. 53 The monitor would be entitled to retain all of the team
produced value, after compensating the other team members for their
contributions with fixed rewards, which input markets determine. 54
The residual claimant provides the monitor with appropriate
incentives to assemble a productive team and pay close attention to
55
Alchian and Demsetz
maintain that one of the essential characteristics of firms is that they
solve the problem of shirking through the introduction of a
centralized contractual agent, that is, an owner-manager or a manager
44
45

Id. at 265-66.
Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324

(1982).
46

Jean Tirole, Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of
Collusion in Organizations, 2 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 181 (1986).
47
Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the
Firm, 113 Q. J. ECON. 387 (1998).
48
Alchain & Demsetz, supra note 6, at 779.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 779-81.
52
Id. at 781-83.
53
Id. at 779-81.
54
Id. at 781-83.
55
Id. at 779-81.
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who is equipped with the capability of monitoring and the right to
sanction the behavior of all team members.56
shareholders in a large public corporation do not, in fact, play such
an active role as the monitor and residual claimant that the model
predicts. Another problem with the model is that it does not consider
the problems associated with firm-specific investments.57 As Blair
firm, and
each group
explicit contracts. 58 Further, the firm-specific investments, once
59
These investments reduce
60
and therefore expose the contributors
61

Assuming that the firm is made up of firm-specific investments,
Rajan and Zingales developed a theory of the firm based on the
property rights approach in terms of power and access to resources.62
They further discuss the risks of underinvestment associated with
firm-specific investments: any party not in control of firm-specific
investments has an incentive to under invest thereby avoiding a
controlling party, while firm-specific investments may make it less
lucrative to sell the property rights to a third party. 63
3.

CRITIQUE

Blair and Stout developed their team production model to serve
both positive and normative purposes.64 They contend that the team
56

Id.
Blair & Stout, supra note 25, at 275; see also, e.g., Rajan &
Zingales, supra note 47; Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and
Economic Organization, 36 J. L. & ECON. 453 (1993).
58
Blair & Stout, supra note 25, at 275.
59
Id. at 276. See infra text accompanying notes 64-69.
60
Id. at 277 79 (observing participants having made firm-specific
57

61

Id. at 276.
Rajan & Zingales, supra note 47.
63
Id. at 406 11 (relaxing the assumption that the value of an asset for
other uses increases at least somewhat with specific investments).
64
Blair & Stout, supra note 25, at 288 289.
62
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production model better reflects
corporation as directors left alone to manage the corporate affairs.65
According to Blair and Stout, however, the team production model
requires the Board of Directors to serve all constituencies, rather than
the shareholders alone. 66 They also argue that the model is a better
positivist approach in that a board balances interests among various
constituencies in practice as well as a better normative approach.67
In fact, U.S. corporate law gives directors remarkable discretion to
and other non-shareholder constituencies.68 Further, statutes in over
half the states expressly allow boards to weigh non-shareholder
interests for takeover threats. 69 Directors have broad discretion to
adopt takeover defenses, which allows them to promote other
sts over short-term shareholder wealth
70
maximization. The team production model offers incentives for all
team members and describes the fundamental contracting problem
that corporate law attempts to resolve. 71 However, the team
production theory attracted considerable criticism directed at its
descriptive and normative claims.72
In terms of the descriptive claim, criticism of the team
production theory indicates that boards of directors are not in fact
independent; in reality, management often dominates them even in

65

Id. at 287-319.
Id. at 288.
67
Id. at 290-92.
68
Id. at 327-28 n.208.
69
See id. at 303-04 n.144 (stating that twenty-eight states allow
directors to consider non-shareholder interests); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A
Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency
Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579 n.1, 587 n.33 (1992) (listing the statutes).
70
See Fisch, supra note 19, at 651.
71
Blair & Stout, supra note 25, at 327-28.
72
See, e.g., John C. Coates, IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating
Hierarchy: How Contestable Are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP.
L.837 (1999); Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law: A Critical Assessment, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629 (2002); David
Millon, New Game Plan or Business as Usual - A critique of the Team
Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001 (2000). Blair &
see, e.g., Peter C. Kostant, Team
Production and the Progressive Corporate Law Agenda, 35 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 667 (2002).
66
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corporations with a majority of non-management directors. 73
Moreover, critics claim that Blair and Stout overlook the impact of
the stock market. 74 Boards cannot ignore the impact due to
fluctuation in the stock prices. 75 The theory depends upon the
conflicting interests between shareholders and non-shareholder
constituencies. 76 Blair and Stout assert that corporate law reflects
their argument that it vests the directors with the exclusive power to
manage the corporation and insulates them from shareholder
interference or any other team member. 77 The greater concern is
whether boards actually function as the team production model says
they should; in reality, a strong preference for short-term share price
maximization binds directors because this is what most institutional
shareholders want. 78 Thus, the problem with the team production
model is that boards are not in fact independent at all and do not have
board discretion, and directors do not and cannot behave the way the
theory says they should.79
Under U.S. corporate law, however, shareholders alone enjoy
voting rights, information rights, and the right to bring derivative
suits.80 Blair and Stout argue that, although shareholders alone have
independence because the very large number of shareholders means
81
The
argument is not persuasive in terms of a normative claim, although
the reality is such as they argue. Furthermore, it is doubtful that the
team production model provides the Board with any incentive to
73

Coates, supra note 72 at 845-47.
Id. at 849.
75
See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate
Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.110 (1965) (arguing that boards and managers
have an incentive to maximize the stock price, independently of any legal
duty to do so, because a depressed stock price makes the corporation a
potential
74

76

See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 33, at 416-18 (detailing the
relationship between shareholders and non-shareholders).
77
Id. at 423-24.
78
Id. at 428-30.
79
David Millon, Team Production Theory: A Critical Appreciation,
62 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 79, 80-81 (2014).
80
Blair & Stout, supra note 33, at 409 n.10.
81
Id. at 434.
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perform its duties conscientiously.82 Therefore, from the normative
aspect, Bl

From the normative and positive aspects, the nexus of contracts
model is slightly ahead of the team production model. However, in
terms of the discretionary powers of the Board of Directors, the
director primacy model is somewhat further ahead. Proponents of the
director primacy model claim that boards must be mostly free of
shareholder interference to serve shareholder interests. 83
Stephen Bainbridge draws upon the theory of the firm (in
contrast to the team production theory but in accordance with the
nexus of contracts theory), arguing that shareholders alone, as
opposed to other stakeholders, are the appropriate beneficiaries of
director fiduciary duties.84 According to the director primacy model,
directors are ultimately responsible for shareholder wealth
maximization, rather than promoting stakeholder interests, 85 and the
interests of shareholders should prevail over those of any other
constituencies. 86 Additionally, directors (rather than managers,
shareholders, and stakeholders) are completely responsible for
control over the corporation.87 Bainbridge recognizes that directors
Republic. 88 Under the
s
of contracts; rather, Bainbridge argues that the firm has a nexus of its
contracts which is a board of directors well-equipped with the
89
He argues that the powers of the Board of
Directors are original and undelegated, and that neither shareholders

82

Meese, supra note 72, at 1665-66.
See Kostant, supra note 72, at 693-94.
84
Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 550.
85
Id. at 572.
86
Id. at 577-85.
87
Id. at 550.
88
Id. at 550-51, 560; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of
Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1, 8 & n.28 (2002)
83

89

E.g., Bainbridge, supra note 16, at 554-60.
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-making authority. 90
The Board negotiates with and hires the various factors of production
91
Thus, the Board of Directors, not shareholders, is
and should be in control of the corporation, exercising almost
unconstrained authority to ensure corporate decision-making
efficiency.
Bainbridge argues that there is a core tension between the
shareholder voting rights are one of the mechanisms that hold
directors accountable.92
board decisions might weaken the core of corporate governance and
shifting the power of decision-making to shareholders is undesirable
in itself in accordance with director primacy. 93 As a positive matter,
Bainbridge contends that the director-centered model of the firm
matches both modern corporate practice and the structure of most
state laws (particularly Delaware, the dominant model).94 As noted
above, however, director primacy might also face difficulties because
of CEO domination and performance of some functions required
under corporate governance. Part III addresses such functions and
the reality in which the shift of authority to the independent board
has weakened boards. Thus, CEOs find themselves in an extremely
powerful position.

III. MONITORING AND MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
This part first addresses the functions that corporate law asserts a
board of directors should perform and then argues that a board of
directors, in a large public corporation, is ineffective for performing
such functions. Boards of public corporations primarily have two
areas: monitoring the activities of the corporate executives and
95

90

Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 11-12 (stating shareholder wealth
maximization is the law in the United States).
91
Bainbridge, supra note 16, at 560.
92
Id. at 555-60.
93
Id. at 557-59.
94
Id. at 568-74; see also Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 105-53
95

Compare, Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 790 805 (2011) (discussing the dual monitoring
and management functions of the modern board), with STEPHEN M.
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management responsibilities essentially involve making the final
decision on major issues, such as issuing dividends, pursuing mergers
and acquisitions, and the like.96
responsibilities primarily involve appointing the CEO and evaluating
the management team.97
has various degrees of autonomy and control in relation to the
98

Modern corporate law includes
board, which usually requires the Board to have independent
directors.
personal or financial relationship with the firm. 99 Part-time, or
independent directors, are arguably never equipped to make
corporate policy or manage the corporate business. 100 Will they be
ill-equipped in the context of monitoring? Melvin Eisenberg
challenged the insider-dominated boards of the day and argued that
the modern board should serve as an independent monitor that works
to protect shareholder interests. 101 Eisenberg asserted that there is
one function that the Board can perform better than any other
corporate group:
102
Through the notion of
the monitoring board, Eisenberg tried to change the reality so that it
was not the Board, but the executives who actually managed the
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 49 50,
61 (2012) (indicating that the literature identifies three functions for the
public board: (1) monitoring and disciplining management, (2) providing
advice and guidance to managers, and (3) providing a network of useful
political and business contacts.).
96
Alces, supra note 95, at 798.
97
See Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV.
265, 269 71 (1997).
98
Bainbridge, supra note 16, at 559-60 (from a legal perspective, any
control a CEO has is delegated from the Board to the CEO the Board
ultimately retains control.). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2013).
99
Daniele Marchesani, The Concept of Autonomy and the
Independent Director of Public Corporations, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 315,
322-23 (2005).
100
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in
the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L.
REV. 375, 387 (1975).
101 See
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, THE STRUCTURE OF THE
CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1976).
102
Id. at 170.
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corporation.103 By the end of the 1970s, the ideal board became a
monitoring board rather than a merely nominal body. 104 If a board is
free of conflicts of interests that is, free of ties to the CEO then it
hus,
notion of the independent monitoring board
now dominates corporate governance.105
Therefore, the independent board monitors executive officers,
including CEOs, to ensure that they run the corporation for the
benefit of the shareholders.106 Indeed, increasing Board independence
has been the key to corporate governance reform for the past three
decades. In designing a monitoring board for a public corporation,
federal and state laws, as well as public listing rules, have required
certain functions. After the Enron and WorldCom scandals, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 effectively required an independent
audit committee. 107 Furthermore, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 stipulated that public
corporations must have independent audit and compensation
committees. 108
The rules of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and the
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations
(NASDAQ) influenced most large public corporations to have a
majority of independent directors on the full board and on several
oversight committees.109 However, these reforms have not improved

103

Id. at 140.
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the
United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices,
59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1518 (2007).
105 See also Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 53.
106
Roberta S. Karmel, Should a Duty to the Corporation Be Imposed
on Institutional Shareholders?, 60 BUS. LAW. 1, 17 (2004) (describing the
104

107

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 303, 116 Stat.
745, 778 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7201).
108
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900 (2010) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78j-3).
109 See Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the
Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers Too, 22
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 282-88 (2006) (describing the NYSE requirements).
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board performance, which some commentators have pointed out. 110
Thus, in terms of the efficacy of corporate governance, repeated
regulatory efforts to increase board independence have unfortunately
proved futile or even counterproductive.
First, the independent monitoring board has been criticized for
being ineffective at performing even the most basic monitoring
function. 111 Directors inevitably rely heavily on executive officers
for the information they use in monitoring tasks. 112 Moreover,
directors from outside the corporation or the industry only have
information, and therefore have to depend heavily on executive
officers for information about the corporation and the industry.
Furthermore, they have limited time, expertise, and attention to
Ironically,
the shift to the independent board has weakened boards and,
moreover, placed the CEO in an extremely powerful position in a
corporation.
Directors are at a disadvantage in monitoring executive officers,
because they cannot avoid relying heavily on those officers for the
information they use to monitor themselves. This problem with the
monitoring structure became apparent particularly during the recent
financial crisis. 113 Independent monitoring boards could not discover
any serious problems with the business decisions that executive
officers were making and, thus, could not prevent the collapse of
110

See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation
Between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J.
CORP. L. 231, 233 (2002); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Independent Directors and
Stock Market Prices: The New Corporate Governance Paradigm 34 43
(Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 301, 2006) (showing several
studies have found no correlation between corporate performance and board
See, e.g., Catherine M. Daily &
Dan R. Dalton, Board of Directors Leadership and Structure: Control and
Performance Implications, 17 ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THEORY AND PRACTICE
65, 75 (1993) (indicating some studies find a positive impact from increased
board independence.). See, e.g., April Klein, Firm Performance and Board
Committee Structure, 41 J.L. & ECON. 275, 300 01 (1998) (other studies find
a negative impact from increased board independence.).
111 Fisch, supra note 97, at 268-70.
112 Alces, supra note 95, at 795.
113 See generally Lisa Fairfax, Government Governance and the Need
to Reconcile Government Regulation with Board Fiduciary Duties, 95 MINN.
L. REV. 1692 (2011).
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financial firms. As Lawrence Mitchell pointed out, the CEO can
easily manipulate or suppress the information provided to the Board
because the position is typically the sole, or nearly sole, source of
information for the Board.114 Thus, most boards are rather passive,
because CEOs dominate the Board and employ their power in their
own interests.115 If the Board remains passive, there is no one who
actively questions
s or
decisions. If boards had successfully monitored serious events, such
as the recent financial crisis, and relied on their independent
information, they might have been able to challenge the CEOs and
management on the long-term wisdom of these decisions. It is
difficult to provide independent directors with strong incentives to
monitor executive officers more carefully.116
In terms of management function, most boards of modern public
corporations are now composed of mostly independent directors;
however, it has been general practice for the CEO to serve as the
chairman of the Board of Directors.117 That means the CEO sets the
board meetings. In most instances, the
management function, because they know more about the day-to-day
business of the firm as well as its relationship with the various
corporate constituencies. As noted above, the Board must rely
heavily on inside directors for information and judgment, and the
make independent business decisions. Independent directors are illequipped to second-guess the decisions of the CEO and the

114

Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structural Holes, CEOs, and Informational
Monopolies: The Missing Link in Corporate Governance, 70 BROOKLYN. L.
REV. 1313, 1350 (2005).
115 Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the ManagementCaptured Board The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV.
127, 127 (1996). See generally Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside
Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence,
90 NW. U. L. REV. 898, 898 903, 913 17 (1996) (cataloging the many ways
in which CEOs dominate outside directors).
116
Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside
Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 875
(1991).
117 See Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate Governance in America
1950 2000: Major Changes But Uncertain Benefits, 25 J. CORP. L. 349, 351
(2000).
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management team. 118 Further, outside directors may avoid asking
complex questions and presenting strategic alternatives.119 Thus, the
independent board is not well-equipped to make final decisions and
must rely heavily on the information and judgment of others who are
more involved in the everyday business of the corporation.
Therefore, it is not assumed to be the outside board members but
the executive officers who work most directly and closely with
various constituencies and perform the mediation function in the firm.
Contrary to the claims of the team production model, boards of most
public corporations do not serve as independent mediators of
conflicting interests between shareholders and other stakeholders.
The Board does not and cannot perform a meaningfully independent
role in significant decision-making. Senior officers, through the
largely decide the day-to-day business of the corporation. Even if a
corporation moves to the adoption of supermajority independent
boards, the CEO, paradoxically, continues to be the significant
decision-maker in the modern public corporation.
Corporate
governance theory generally ignores this reality, at least for public
corporations.
The team production model assumes that directors actively and
continuously mediate among the various interests of shareholder,
labor, management, community, and any other stakeholders. As
some commentators point out, mediating among corporate
corresponding obligations.120 However, the modern part-time board
member simply is not expected to take such an active role in
management. While in the real world, senior officers know much
more about such a role than the Board does and often negotiate the
n senior
officers for independent monitoring to adjust and mediate the

118

Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 116, at 889 (observing that outside
directors rarely exercise their judgment today, not only because they lack the
.
119
120

Id.
Alces, supra note 95, at 801.
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different claims of different constituencies. 121 In sum, independent
directors are ill-equipped to serve as mediators of diverse and
conflicting corporate constituency interests. Thus, the mediator of
such constituency interests, if any, is not the Board but the CEO,
even if the Board is assumed to mediate between corporate
constituencies under the team production theory. Therefore, it may be
unconvincing to argue that the Board is in a particularly good
position to perform the mediation function. Hence, the team
production model might not signify the reality in the firm. 122
Additionally, in the real world, director primacy might also face the
same difficulties for the same reason of CEO domination.123

IV. A PROPOSAL FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS:
ENLIGHTENED SHAREHOLDER VALUE MODEL
One of the key tensions within any system of corporate
governance is the necessary trade-off between authority and
accountability. 124 In that case, the underlying issue in corporate
governance is the need for balance between the authority granted to
shareholders seek.125 Bainbridge also argues that there is an inherent
primacy model, such that when shareholders provide capital to a
121

See, e.g., Anne Tucket Nees,
Oversight Liability within the Corporate Puzzle, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 199, 251
(2010).
122
Additionally, as noted in Part III, the team production theory
opposes the structure of modern U.S. corporate law in which shareholders
alone enjoy the right of electing directors and the corporate objective of
shareholder wealth maximization.
123 See Bainbridge, supra note 16, at 567, 569 (regarding the Board as
both the ultimate monitor and a body that exercises fiat in the corporation).
124 E.g., Stephen Bainbridge, Bruner on Director Primacy and Other
Pure Theories of Corporate Governance, businessassociationsblog.com
(Sept.
4,
2007),
http://www.businessassociationsblog.com/
lawandbusiness/comments/brunerondirectorprimacyandotherpuretheoriesofc
orporategovernance/ (stating that corporate governance reflects the balancing
125

See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES122-23
(10th ed. 2007).
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corporation they implicitly contract for the directors to pursue
shareholder wealth maximization.126 Thus, we first have to discuss
whether the governance structure ensures that the accountability will
Another factor to consider is that the economic crisis exposed
substantial issues which stemmed from the connection of CEO
compensation incentives with short-term gains. This problem has
become more serious due to the passivity of modern public boards,
he/she provides. The corporate governance structure must be
reformed to read just such an incentive structure in favor of the longterm well-being of the corporation. George Dent argues that
shareholder rights must be expanded to achieve the goal of
addressing the issue of CEO domination.127 However, transferring
power from CEOs to shareholders will not necessarily solve this
problem. Proposals to increase shareholder power are criticized for
being ineffective and inadequate partly because shareholders are at
an informational disadvantage and partly because they tend to be
indifferent to their voting power and to another kind of shareholder
power, such as derivative suits and information rights.128 If the goal
of corporate governance reform is to increase the long-term wellbeing and value of the corporation, some shareholders may have a
short-term bias that prevents CEOs from effectively achieving this
long-term goal.
As noted above, independent mediators of conflicting interests in
most public corporations are not a board of directors but CEOs. In a
normative light, the Board should still serve as both a monitor for
manager that makes a final decision on fundamental corporate issues
through considering such constitu
The team
production theory has provided the perspective that the Board of
Directors should assume the role of a mediating hierarch among all
126

Bainbridge supra note 16, at, 605, 573 (arguing the key to
corporate governance lies in maintaining the proper balance of authority and
accountability).
127
See, George W. Dent, Academics in Wonderland: The Team
Production and Director Primacy and Models of Corporate Governance, 44
HOUS. L. REV. 1213, 1273 (2008).
128 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89
MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990) (this is often referred to as a collective action
problem).
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constituencies, including shareholders. Thus, this theory presents a
substantial
corporate governance. Incidentally, the director primacy model is
concerned with the allocation of power within the firm, but has little
to say about how that power is to be used other than requiring that it
be used to maximize shareholder wealth. 129
I propose that any corporate governance reform must focus
primarily on promoting the long-term well-being of the corporation,
transparency). In light of this goal, I will examine a proposal for
corporate governance reforms, that is, the
(ESV)
currently accepted in the United Kingdom.

The U.K. Companies Act 2006 (the Act) attempts to reconcile
-term and
130
stakeholder concerns.
This legal duty requires directors to
promote the long-term success of the corporation for the benefit of
the shareholders as a whole, but in doing so, directors must consider
the list of stakeholder interests described in section 172(1) of the
Act. 131 This is referred to as the ESV approach 132 of corporate
governance, which merges elements of the shareholder primacy and
stakeholder models. The Company Law Review (CLR), which

129

See Bainbridge, supra note 16, at 792 (contrasting Blair & Stout,
Bainbridge states he did not approach the Board of Directors from a
the director primacy model.).
130 See also Paul L. Davies, Enlightened Shareholder Value and the
New
Responsibilities
of
Directors
(Oct.
4,
2005),
http://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/1710014/94Enlightened_Shareholder_Value_and_the_New_Responsibilities_of_Directo
rs1.pdf (arguing the ESV approach is not very different from a shareholder
approach).
131 See COMPANIES ACT 2006, c. 46, § 712 (U.K.).
132 Id.; Daniel Attenborough, The Company Law Reform Bill: An
, 27
COMPANY LAW 162, 165 (2006).
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worked on the Act, accepted the concept of the ESV as a
fundamental principle in corporate governance. 133

1. DIRECTORS FIDUCIARY DUTY
The core of the ESV principle is embodied in section 172 of the
Act, which defines the fiduciary duties of directors:
A director of a company must act in the way he considers,
in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the
company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so
have regard (amongst other matters) to
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term,

(c)
with suppliers, customers, and others,
(d)
and the environment,
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation
for high standards of business conduct, and
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the
134

shareholder who is interested in the long-term well-being and
performance of the corporation and its social and environmental
impact.135 Under this ESV approach, directors, who are ultimately
required to promote shareholder interests, must consider the factors
The
fundamental elements of the ESV model are: (1) an explicit focus on
long-term shareholder value as the goal of the corporation and (2) a
requirement that directors consider the impact of their decisions on
section 172 to promote the success of the corporation, however, on
133

See Andrew Keay, Tackling the Issue of the Corporate Objective:
older Value
Approach, 29 SYDNEY L. REV. 577, 579 (2007).
134 Id. at 591.
135 See Andrew Keay, Moving towards Stakeholderism? Constituency
Statutes, Enlightened Shareholder Value, and More: Much Ado about Little,
22 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 1, 40 (2011).
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the premise that no change in the corporate decision-maker (i.e., the
stakeholders is made at all.136 In terms of the last premise, under the
Act, directors remain directly accountable only to shareholders, and
the Board is maintained as the decision-making authority of the
corporation. 137 Thus, the Act defines shareholders as the sole
corporate constituency entitled to elect directors, bring derivative
suits, and authorize interested transactions.
The
formulated in terms of the notion that shareholder value depends
138

Hence,
although section 172 of the Act, which includes the ESV approach,
addressed.139

us

also consider the interests of other key constituencies as long as such
consideration promotes the success of the corporation for the benefits
of its shareholders.140 A major concern here was whether to uphold
the notion of the shareholder primacy approach or whether a
for this approach.141 Contrary to the claims of the ESV approach, the
approach
that directors should consider all
relevant constituencies interests equally, which include those of
shareholders, and that directors should give primacy to nonshareholder constituencies, even sacrificing shareholders interests in
136

See Virginia Harper Ho,
Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36
IOWA J. CORP. L. 59, 79 (2010).
137 See generally COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 131.
138
See Keay, supra note 133, at 579.
139 See Andrew Keay, Enlightened Shareholder Value, The Reform of
the Duties of Corporation Directors and the Corporate Objective, LLOYD S
MAR. COM.L. Q. 335, 339 (2006); see also Keay supra note 135, at 2, 18.
140 See John Lowry, The Duty of Loyalty of Company Directors:
Bridging the Accountability Gap through Efficient Disclosure, 68
CAMBRIDGE L. J. 607, 616 (2009).
141 See Gavin Kelly & John Parkinson, The Conceptual Foundations
of the Company: A Pluralist Approach, THE POL. ECON. OF THE COMPANY
(
throughout).
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case of a conflict in interests between shareholders and nonshareholders. 142 Although the CLR recognized the merits of the
stakeholder approach, it did not recommend its adoption and finally
chose a modified model, which is the ESV model.

2. NARRATIVE REPORTING
The U.K. has expanded
In
section 417(2) of the Act, the statutory objective of the business
review is declared, which holds that directors, not the corporation,
are required to compile a business review to inform shareholders of
the corporation and help them assess and evaluate how the directors
have performed their duty under section 172. 143 Thus, the Act
requires directors in public corporations to recognize and report on
the non-exhaustive list of factors specified in section 172(1)as part of
the comprehensive disclosures to investors. 144 The business review
description of the principal risks and uncertainties facing the
145
Further, i
main trends and factors likely to affect the future development and
146
performance of the listed
Specifically, the
business review for a listed corporation must include information
community issues, and essential contractual arrangements. 147 The
analysis in the business review must be based on both financial and
non-financial key performance indicators (KPIs). 148 The narrative
in the United Kingdom
possibly goes further than the narrative reporting system in the
United States, which is more focused on financial performance. The

142

Id.
See COMPANIES ACT 2006, c. 46, § 417(2) (U.K.).
144 Id.
regime are exempted from the business review requirement).
145
Id. at § 417(3)(a)-(b).
146 Id. at § 417(4)-(5).
147 Id. at§ 417(5) (if the business review does not include the relevant
information, it must include a statement detailing which kind of information
is not contained therein.).
148
Id. at § 417(6).
143
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increasing, and the U.K. government in early 2012 proposed a
strategic
149

r

Thus, in August 2013, the Companies Reform Regulations 2013
amended the Act which implements the strategic report and the
417 of the Act. 150 All U.K. corporations, except those that are
r annual report. The strategic report is to
cover the same material as the old business review, such as, in the
case of listed corporations, principal risks and uncertainties, and KPIs.
The new strategic report, in relation to strategy and business model,
the gender of the directors, senior managers, employees of the
corporation, and human rights issues and policies, requires listed
corporations to provide additional disclosures. 151
As seen from sections 172, 417, and 414A-D of the Act, the U.K.
corporate law reforms require boards to justify their decisions in
terms of long-term shareholder value and stakeholder interests, and
to disclose risks impacting stakeholders. 152 By doing so, the U.K.
has made management at least indirectly accountable to stakeholders.
The factors listed in section 172(1) and the strategic report and
which requests compliance with such sections, will
allow directors to defend any bona fide business decision aimed at
promoting the success of the corporation.153 However, section 463 of
the Act causes a director to be liable for compensating the
149

See COMPANIES ACT 2006, c. 46, § 414A (U.K.) (In August 2013,
the Companies Reform Regulations 2013 amended the Companies Act 2006,
ss review in
the now superseded section 417 of the Act.); see § 414C(2)(4) (the Strategic
Report now incorporates the former requirements of the superseded
tegy, business model, and gender diversity on the
Board.).
150

COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 149, at § 414A.
Id. at §414C(8).
152 Id. at §§ 172, 417, 414(A)-(D).
153 Id. at § 172(1); COMPANIES ACT 2006 (STRATEGIC REPORTS AND
DIRECTOR S REPORT) REGULATIONS 2013 S.I. 2008/393, (§ 414C(1)) (U.K.).
151
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corporation for any of its own losses if the director knowingly makes
statement, or summary financial statements. 154 In sum, the U.K.
compliance with such sections and to simultaneously push
corporations in the direction of greater social responsibility. 155

V. OTHER PROGRESS
In 2010 the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) published The
U.K. Corporate Governance Code (the Code as updated in 2014),
which sets out standards of good practice for listed corporations on
board composition and on development, remuneration, shareholder
relations, accountability, and audit.156 Additionally, in 2011 the FRC
157
published the
The
guidance is intended to assist companies in applying the principles of
the Code, which relates primarily to Sections A and B that deal with
the leadership and effectiveness of the Board, per Listing Rule
9.8.6.158 In the case of a listed company, its annual financial report
must include (1) a statement of how the listed company has applied
the Main Principles set out in the Code in a manner that would enable
shareholders to evaluate the application of the principles, and (2) a
statement as to whether the listed company has complied with all
relevant provisions set out in the Code or has not complied with all
relevant provisions set out in the Code.159 If the company has not
complied with all relevant provisions, it must include a statement
setting out those provisions with which it has not complied and the

154

See COMPANIES ACT 2006, c. 46, § 463, (U.K.).
See Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third
Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38
CORNELL INT L L. J. 493, 500 (2005).
156 See FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE CODE (2014),
157
See FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, GUIDANCE ON BOARD
EFFECTIVENESS (2011).
158 See FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, LISTING RULE 9.8.4 (May
16, 2014) https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/LR/9/8.html
159 See FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, supra note 157, at 9.8.6 (5)
and (6).
155
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-compliance. 160 This means the Listing
Rules apply the so-called comply or explain rule.

VI. E.U. CORPORATE REFORM
In addition to the U.K. movement, there is E.U. corporate reform.
The Council of the European Commission adopted Directive
2013/34/EU on
disclosure of non-financial
information.161 If a company is large (i.e., listed and non-listed, but
having more than 250 employees), the Board must prepare a
management report containing the analysis including both financial
and non-financial key performance indicators relevant to the
particular business, including information relating to environmental
and employee matters.162
According to E.U. Directive 2014/95/EU, which amended the
said Accounting Directive, the Board must disclose information to
the extent necessary for an understanding of the undertaking's
development, performance, position and impact of its activity,
relating to environmental, social and employee matters, respect for
human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters. 163 Moreover,
large listed companies shall also disclose information regarding the
diversity of the Board.164 The required disclosure must also include
mentioned matters, the results of these policies, and the risks related
to these matters, and how the company manages those risks.165 The
transparency and performance on environmental and social matters,
and therefore, to contribute effectively to long-term economic growth
160

FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE CODE, supra note 156.
161
Council Directive 182/19, art.19, 2013 O.J. (L182/19) (EC).
162 Id.
163 Directive 2014/95, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 22 October 2014 as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity
information by certain large undertakings and groups, 2014 O.J. (L 330/1).
19(a); see European Commission Memoranda MEMO/14/301, Disclosure of
Non-financial and Diversity Information by Large Companies and Groups
Frequently Asked Questions (April 15, 2014).
164 See Article 20 (g) of Directive 2014/95/EU.
165 See European Commission Memoranda, supra note 163. See also
Article 29a of Directive 2014/95/EU.
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166

More transparency will help companies better
manage the opportunities and non-financial risks.167 These directives
are aimed at complementing the narrative reporting regulations in the
United Kingdom.168
regulations, as mentioned above, U.K. listed companies will be
model, human rights and gender diversity in their strategic report,
and providing information on greenhouse gas emissions in their
169

Expansion of the disclosure of financial and non-financial
information and the narrative reporting system that has been adopted
in the United Kingdom and the E.U. are helping increase the
accountability and transparency of the decision-making process in
terms of considering multi-stakeholder interests. The recent progress
in this regard should be positively evaluated in terms of corporate
governance.

Is it acceptable under U.S. corporate law that directors are able
to or must consider the interests of other constituencies besides
shareholders? Is such consideration in conflict with the notion of
shareholder wealth maximization?
Under Delaware law, the fiduciary duty of loyalty requires
directors to act in the best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders,170 and most states have the same or almost the same
statutes. However, under U.S. corporate law, directors should also
consider the interests of other corporate constituencies to the extent
that those interests meet the best interests of the shareholders. Thus,
the above description is like the ESV approach used in the United
166

See European Commission Memoranda, supra note 163.
Id.
168 International
Accounting Standards Board, Regulations
implementing EU Non-Financial Reporting Directive published (Sept. 16,
2017, 11:09AM), https://www.iasplus.com/en-gb/news/2016/12/regulationsimplementing-eu-non-financial-reporting-directive-published.
169 Id.
170 ATR-Kim Eng. Fin. Corp. v. Araneta, No. CIV.A. 489-N, 2006 WL
3783520, at 16 (Del Ch. Dec. 21, 2006) (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503,
510 (Del. 1983)).
167
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Kingdom.
framework for addressing the above questions.
Elhauge argues that managers have, and should have, discretion
under corporate law to sacrifice profits in the public
interest, 171essentially, the interests of non-shareholders. 172 Elhauge
corporate profits to further public interest goals that are not required
173
and that the existence of managerial discretion to sacrifice
profits in the public interest is rather socially desirable. 174
Additionally, this would be true even if the objective of corporate
entails the business judgment rule. According to Elhauge, the
business judgment rule in effect leaves managers with latent
discretion to sacrifice profits in the public interest, which discretion
Elhauge argues is socially desirable. 175 Thus, the business judgment
rule protects most managerial decisions that involve potential
shareholder stakeholder conflicts of interest. 176 In support of his
argument, Elhauge points to the so-called constituency statutes that
many states enacted which authorize managers explicitly to consider
the interests of non-shareholder constituencies and the American Law
Principles of Corporate Governance, which authorize
boards of directors to devote a reasonable amount of resources to
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Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest,
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 739 (2005). See, e.g., LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL,
CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA S NEWEST EXPORT (2001); Cynthia
Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999); Ian B. Lee, Is There a Cure
42 AM. BUS. L. J. 65(2005); Shlensky v.
Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (leading case on profitsacrificing decisions).
172 Elhauge, supra note 171, at 744.
173
Id. at 763.
174 Id. at 738 40.
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176 See id. at 775; see also Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an
Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 177, 181
(2008).
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entails a net economic loss.177 Further, Elhauge refers to Delaware
case law on takeovers, particularly Unocal Corp v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 178
interests are not a controlling factor. 179 According to Elhauge,
er the business judgment rule, courts are extraordinarily willing
least in the short run) on the grounds that they may conceivably
180
More or less any
decision to sacrifice profits has a conceivable link to long-term
profits; therefore, this suffices to give managers substantial de facto
discretion to sacrifice profits in the public interest. 181 Elhauge further
argues that when managers sacrifice profits in the public interest,
182

Consequently, he suggests that maximizing shareholder welfare is
not the same thing as maximizing shareholder profits.183
The United States and the United Kingdom have the same
structure of dispersed share ownership and well-developed securities
markets and depend upon a similar stock market for corporate control.
Moreover, in both countries, stock ownership has become
increasingly concentrated in institutions such as mutual funds or
pension funds. Indeed, there are many reasons why such a
stakeholder-oriented regulatory shift is unlikely.
Per some
commentators, key differences between the dominant institutional
investors in the United Kingdom (i.e., pension funds) and the United
environments, make stakeholder-oriented corporate reform less likely
in the United States.184 However, I do not believe these differences
are crucial to introducing the ESV approach to the United States.
Moreover, the regulatory framework for the exercise of
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Elhauge, supra note 171, at 763 66 (citing 1 Am. Law Inst.,
Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations
§ 2.01(b)(3) (1992)).
178 Id. at 764 65 (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)).
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much more empowering as compared to the United States. 185 The
enhanced narrative reporting regime proposed in the United
Kingdom has the objective of making a significant impact on the
scrutiny, and engagement. However, I am not suggesting that we
governance by
achieving the narrative reporting regime and finally moving on to
shareholder primacy. Structural issues such as short-termism and the
reliance on capital market gains, rather than long-term corporate
of engagement. Many
institutional shareholders delegate investment management to asset
managers, and their short-termism relationships with asset managers
contribute to the short-term prospects of investment management. I,
rather, contend that the narrative reporting regime would ensure
monitoring function and market discipline, which would ultimately
improve corporate governance. Moreover, such narrative reporting
would enhance the communication between the Board and the CEO,
and the corporation and all stakeholders thereby helping solve the
asymmetric information problem.
There might be criticisms to my argument explained above,
orttermism, which caused the recent financial crisis. First, there might
be skepticism that narrative reporting is useful in avoiding such a
crisis. One commentator argues that the enhancement of corporate
disclosure in narrative reporting would not likely have any significant
impact on investor behavior, in terms of shareholder engagement,
because investors probably use such disclosure not for engagement
(especially institutional shareholders) but for trading decisions. 186
However, assuming that we cannot completely change CEO
domination and asymmetric information, the capital market must
change in terms of socially responsible investment, and the
enhancement of the norm of the ESV and the disclosure supporting
such norm would surely lead to improvement in the accountability
185

CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE
COMMON-LAW WORLD: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER
POWER 36 37 (2013).
186 See Iris H-Y Chiu, Reviving Shareholder Stewardship: Critically
Examining the Impact of Corporate Transparency Reforms in the UK, 38
DEL. J. CORP. L. 983, 1009 1011 (2014) (arguing that narrative reporting
may be criticized as being too subjective and qualitative).
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and sustainable growth of corporations, which would in turn lead to
shareholder engagement. As noted above, I support the director
primacy model wherein the Board is in control of the corporation.
Hence, exercising almost unconstrained authority to ensure corporate
decision-making efficiency. Second, there might a question whether
the ESV approach and narrative reporting infringe on
traditional role as a central decisiondiscretion might be constrained to some extent to perform fiduciary
duty in terms of the ESV approach and disclosure of nonfinancial
information. However, the said framework would be intended not to
empower shareholders or enhance shareholder activism, but to ensure
the accountability of the directors, who have broad discretion. Under
the ESV model, directors still have broad discretion regarding which
interests of constituencies they consider and how they consider such
interests.
To avoid a future financial crisis corporate governance reform
must focus primarily on promoting the long-term well-being of the
accountability and transparency. For these purposes, I argue that a
combination of the ESV approach and the narrative reporting system
as used in United Kingdom187 would be a more effective approach to
address this problem. In terms of the norm, however, we should
retain the director primacy model rather than the team production
model, as we have to deal with the reality that boards depend heavily
upon CEOs for corporate information, although they must perform a
monitoring function. There are difficulties in overcoming such a
dilemma between director primacy and CEO domination. In sum, it
is incorrect to assume that only a board that is made up of
independent or outside directors can monitor well because the way in
which the monitoring function works within a corporation is different
for each corporation. 188
Globalization trends related to
communication between corporation and stakeholders, including
189
Based on the
idea that transparency will lead to sound management and
187
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See Gordon, supra note 104, at 1505 09.
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the UK government has proposed corporate transparency reforms in order to
ardship role).
188
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performance improvement, the E.U. believes that requiring the
disclosure of non-financial information will lead to long-term
corporate value. Such a notion and system are sufficiently applicable
to the U.S. model of corporate governance.

VII. CONCLUSION
The current environment where corporations and the global
economy operate presents an important opportunity for reform. 190 It
vernance reform on
enhancing the long-term health and value of the corporation. The
for autonomous action. The team production model is criticized for
action.191 There is no single overriding theory, and strict adherence
to any pure theory would not prove helpful.
the social and
economic roles of the public corporations are so diverse and farreaching that we cannot expect any single concept to serve us well in
192

From the perspective of corporate reform, we must ensure that
the functions that public corporations are expected to perform under
corporate governance will work well as such. I have pointed out
above that the shift to the independent board, which has weakened
the Board as a monitoring body, has caused a problem. However, my
proposal of promoting the long-term well-being of the corporation,
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meeting why
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transparency seems to be still ineffective for addressing this problem.
We must keep in mind that the Board should not perform the
monitoring function on its own. The stock market, gatekeepers, 193
and social norms must supplement corporate governance, 194 and
boards must perform it. The narrative reporting that is currently
expanding in the United Kingdom and the E.U. might help enhance
the monitoring function that the stock market can perform. If a thirdwhich I would recommend, then such a new gatekeeper would work
for corporate governance. Role allocation is necessary for ensuring
the monitoring function for a corporation.
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See generally JOHN C. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS: THE ROLE
PROFESSIONS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
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